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HONESTY AND COIHPETITION: SOl\IE PROBLEMS 
IN THE PRICING OF GOODS 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER* 
 by the authority given the Federal Trade CoIl1lsion,i it 
 would seem that the two most important goals of federal trade regula­
tion are honesty and competition in trade.!! Apparently, little thought 
has been given to a possibility of conflict between the goals. Maximum 
effort is expended in combatting anticompetitive conduct and in inter­
dicting deception. Quaere: May the enforcement of commercial "hon­
esty" be anticompetitive? 
I. THE HONEST STANDARD OF VALUATION 
A threshold problem to the honest price representation of goods is a 
standard of valuation. Much advertising space is filled with assertions 
of the "worth" or "value" of the product.3 An advertiser may represent 
,� Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of L:Lw. 
1. Federal Trade Conunis�ion Act § 5 (a) (6), 33 Stat. 719 (1914), amended by 52 Stat. 
112 (1933), as amended, 15 U.s.C. § 45 (1953) provides: "The Commis,ion is empowered 
and directed to prevent persons • • • from u.<ing unfair methods of competition in com­
merce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." See also Fcdcral Trade 
Commission Act §§ 12-13, 52 Stat. 114 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1953); Clayton Act 
§ 11, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, IS U.S.C. § 21 �195S) j Wool Products L:LbclUlg 
Act § 6, 54 Stat. 1131 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 6Sd (1953); Fur Products L:1bclin� Act § S, 
65 Stat. 179 (1951), 15 U.S.C. § 69f (1953); Lanham Trade-Mark Act § 14 (d) , 60 Stat. 
433 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1953); Te:-:tile Fibre Products Act § 7, 72 Stat. 1721 (1953). 
15 U.S.C. § 70e (1958). 
2. The provisions of § 11 of the Clayton Act, supra note I, alow the Commis�on to 
forbid the types of anticompetitive conduct e.'q)ressly prohibited by the other pro\'oons 
of the act. The broader grant of power under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commblon Act, 
supra note 1, allows: (1) interdiction of .. iolations of the types of anticompetiti\'e conduct 
prohibited by the language of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 2G9 (IS90), as amended, 15 
U.s.C. §§ 1-7 (1958), Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1944); (2) 
prevention of violations of the policy announced by the Sherman Act whether or not the 
Sherman Act could be literally applied, FTC v. Beech-�ut Packing Co., 257 U.s. 441 
(1922); (3) and, apparently, ,iolations of the "spirit" of the Clayton Act even though 
no literal ,iolation of that act could be established, Grand Union Co. v. FTC, .!lJil F.1d 92 
(2d Cir. 1962). As the bulk of the remaining cases demonstratc!, § 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, supra note 1, is also a powerful antidcception provision. See, e.g., Nir�k 
Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.s. 883 (1960) . The remaining 
statutory provisions, supra note 1, are related to specific grants of authority to interdict 
deceptive conduct. 
3. A casual search of a recent magazine revealed: "the finest and your bC!St buy Oil 
any basis of comparison"-"the best value on the market today,,-ue:-:ception:L! value"­
"at 1/3 the price you'd e.'q)ect to pay"-"remarkable value"-"if you\'e been to Southern 
Italy you've seen this work and know that our price is no higher than if you brought it 
home." Advertisements in House Beautiful, March 1962. 
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that his wares-cost him a given amount, are sold by retailers for a 
named price, or "list" for a certain sum. Other methods of determining 
the monetary value appropriately attributable to the product are only 
limited by advertising imagination. The three mentioned, however, suf­
fice to raise the problem. What valuations are honest? 
An advertiser, whether he represents a retailer or not, would seem 
perfectly within the statutory honesty standard if he claimed that a 
certain product "cost" a given amount to produce or "cost" the retailer 
a certain price, assuming only that the "cost" was not falsified. Despite 
the fact that cost is a notoriously illusive concept, it is unlikely that 
an action would be commenced against a "cost" advertiser solely to 
dispute the method of his computations. On the other hand, no en­
couragement is given to this form of advertising over any other in the 
Federal Trade Commission's Guides.4 
A manufacturer's assertion of a regular retail price is dealt with more 
strictly. While the regular retail price is no less a question of fact than 
the "cost" of an item, the information required for an honest factual 
claim is not as necessarily within the knowledge of the seller. Also, in 
this area, the Federal Trade Commission has been quite explicit in 
detailing the requirements of truthfulness. If the retail price in a trading 
area is depressed, an advertisement in that area of a sales price which 
represents the higher national price is deceptive.G If the product is sold 
through "discount houses" as well as stores which command a higher 
price, using the latter price in advertising is equally deceptive.o The 
only permissible declaration of retail price is a statement of the price 
currently charged by all, or at least substantially all, retailers in the 
trade area in which the assertion is made.7 
The use of "suggested" retail prices or "list" prices, whether repre­
sented by lists, catalogues or tickets accompanying the goods, does not 
4. "Guides" are determinations of the Federal Trade Commission concerning polley to 
be used by the Commission staff in evaluating specific practices. They arc released to the 
general public in the interest of obtaining voluntary compliance. Sec, e.g., Guides Against 
Deceptive Pricing, adopted by the Federal Trade Commission October 2, 1958, 2 Trade 
Reg. Rep. II 7897. In the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, supra, there is no mention 
of cost advertising although specific suggestions are made concerning valuo advertising. 
See also note 18 infra and accompanying text. 
S. Baltimore Luggage Co. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 860 
(1962). 
6. Helbros Watch Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. II 15654 (FTC Orders) (Dec. 26, 1961). 
7. The Commission's cease and desist order against the Baltimore Luggage Co. begins 
by requiring the respondent to cease and desist from: '" Representing, directly or by Impli­
cation, by means of pre-ticketing or in any other manner, that any amount Is the usual 
and regular retail price of the merchandise when such amount is in excess of tho prlco 
at which said merchandise is usually and regularly sold at retail in the trade area or areaS 
where the representations are made.''' Baltimore Luggage Co. v. FTC, 296 F.2d at 610. 
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avoid the area price problem. Since the Federal Trade Commission 
considers the suggested or list standard a representation of the current 
retail price/ the lists,9 catalogues/a and ticketsll must conform both to. 
the uniformity requirement and to the territorial limitation.!!! Further­
more, it would seem that price tickets which bear the manufacturer's 
name must properly indicate not only the retailer's intention, but also. 
the area priceP 
One major exception exists, however, in new automobile sales. In 
that field, the manufacturer must list a suggested retail price for his 
cars,14 and the retailer must display the price suggested on the cars.lt; 
Furthermore, there is no requirement interposed that the suggested price 
relate in any specific manner to the prevailing price in the market. 10 
If dissatisfied with the latitude allowed within the above described 
modes of advertising, the manufacturer of a product might use another 
method of valuing his product. Assuming the valuation to be candid 
and the method of arriving at it to be described conspicuously, there 
seems to be no 'ObjectionP If, however, the advertiser prominently 
asserts the result of his computations as the "value" of his product 
(and, presumably, also if he uses a synonym such as "worth") I the 
s. George's Radio & Television Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. fI IS691 (FTC Orders) (Jan. 
19, 1962). 
9. Ibid. 
10. Plaza Luggage & Supply Co., 44 F.T.C. 443 (1943). 
11. Clinton Watch Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d SS3 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 3tiS U.s. 952' 
(1962). 
12. Ibid.; Baltimore Luggage Co. v. FTC, supra note S. 
13. Raye:;: Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 IS323 (FTC Orders) (April 2, 19(2). 
14. Automobile Information Disclosure Act § 3, 72 Stat. 326 (1953), 15 U.s.C. § 1232 
(1958) pro,ides: "Every manufacturer of new automobiles distributed in commerce !:h:il 
. . •  securely af;: to the cindsbield, or Eide v.indow of such automobile a labcl on wbiell 
suel manufacturer shall endor5e clearly, distinctly and legibly true and correct entries 
disclosing the follocing information concerning suell automobile • • • (f) the follocing 
information: (1) the retail price of suel automobile suggested by the manufacturer • • • •  " 
15. Section 4(c) of the Automobile Information Disclosure Act proddes for the fol­
locing penalties for failure to display the suggested price on the car: "Any p(!r;:on who 
willfully removes, alters, or renders illegible any labcl af .. ed to a new automobile pursuant 
to section 3 . • .  shall be fined not more than $1,OCO, or imprisoned not more than one­
year, or both." 72 Stat. 327 (195S), 15 U.s.C. § 1233(c) (1953). 
16. Nowhere in the act or in the House Report supporting the bill is there any ampli­
fication of § 3(f), supra note 14. H.R. Rep. No. 1953, 85th Cong., 2d Se=s. 5 (1953). 
17. \\'hiIe the precise issue does not appear to have been raised, it is clear that: "The
important criterion [in determining 'whether an advertisement is dcccpU\'e] is the net 
impresEion which the  is likely to make on the general populace." Charles 
of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. Y. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944). Literal truth is not 
a defense, P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950), but if the general impres­
Eion given by the ,-aIuation is supportable in fact, the Charles of the Ritz standard would 
seem to apply. 
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advertisement must meet the standards of assertions of the retail price, 
since the Federal Trade Commission finds value and present area selling 
price synonymous.18 
Should the manufacturer desire to suggest a valuation for his product 
based on comparison with other products on the market, such compari­
son is open to him under standards identical to those required of re­
tailers in comparing goods.10 
II. THE HONEST STANDARD OF PRICE COMPARISON 
Price comparison, because it relates to an issue with which the con­
sumer is supposed to be vitally concerned, is a very common form of 
retail advertising.20 If he is able to offer goods at a price which compares 
favorably with his own prior price or the price currently demanded by 
his competitors, a retailer undoubtedly is motivated to communicate this 
fact. To remain within the Trade Commission's standard of honesty, 
however, it is important to observe certain rules. In the first place, there 
is a vast vocabulary to avoid. Irrespective of the correctness of the 
assertion, it is deceptive to advertise-"Regularly," "Usually," "For-
merly," "Originally," "Reduced," "Was ........ Now ........ ," " ........ Per-
.cent off," "Save up to $ ........ ," "You Save $ ........ ," "$50 Dress-$35"-
if the comparison runs to prices charged by others rather than the prices 
formerly charged by the advertising seller.21 Furthermore, if the com­
parison is to another's prices, the advertising dealer must ascertain that 
the prices ascribed to the other dealer are his prices in fact. Gullibility 
does not justify reference to an advertised price which is not actually 
charged.22 The comparison of selling prices to list prices furnished by 
18. Household Sewing Mach. Co., 52 F.T.C. 250 (1955) j "Examples of phrases used 
in connection with prices which have been held to be representations of an article's usual 
and customary retail price are . . .  'Value' . . . •  " Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, supra 
note 4, at 12907. 
19. See notes 20-33 infra and accompanying text. 
20. It appears especially prevalent in local advertisements of retail stores. Two recent 
ClSes arising from such announcements are: Bankers Sec. Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d 403 
(3d Cir. 1961) j Gimbel Bros., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. U 15663 (FTC Orders) (Jan. 2, 1962), 
rev'd, 57 A.T R.R. A-17 (FTC) (Aug. 26, 1962). 
21. Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, supra note 4, at 12907. See Bankers Sec. Corp. 
v. FTC, supra note 20, where the use of "Regular" and "Usual" to truthfully compare 
price to price charged by others was held to be deceptive. In Gimbel Bros., supra note 20, 
where the complaint was ordered dismissed by the hearing examiner when the Commission 
{)ffered no proof that "Usually" and "Regularly" used to compare to the prices of others were 
understood by the public to mean comparison to respondent's own prior prices, the Com­
mission reversed. But d. People v. Minjac Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 320, 151 N.E.2d 180, 175 N.Y.S.2d 
16 (1958) the use of "20'70 to 40'70 OFF" was held to be used deceptively to represent a 
comparison to defendant's own former prices. The impression created by the claim was that 
a reduction was offered over community prices. Hence, a criminal conviction was affirmed. 
22. Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883 
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the manufacturer is also deceptive unless the list price corresponds to 
the price at which the product is being sold by his competitors.:;J 
Having avoided the pitfalls, should the dealer still desire succinctly 
to compare his prices with those of others for the same or similar goods, 
the Trade Commission has provided for this contingency. He may ad­
vertise-"Dacron Suit $20.00-Comparable Suits $25.00"-if certain 
conditions required for honest comparisons are met: (1) it is clearly 
indicated that the comparison is not being made with former prices 
of the advertiser; (2) the compared product is "at least [most?] of like 
grade and quality in all material respects" as the advertised onej (3) the 
compared product is presently sold in the same trade area at the price 
indicated.2-1 Presumably, if there is a sufficient and prominent explana­
tion of what is meant by the comparison, the advertiser may make it 
despite his inability to comply with one of the three conditions.� It is 
not clear, however, how one might advertise briefly that lite same product 
is presently being sold by a competitor. Comparable value would seem 
to indicate a lack of identity in the compared products. "Usually" and 
"Regularly" are pre-empted for other use.21l "Usually sold elsewhere for 
$ ........ " would seem unobjectionable, but this usage is not e;:.-pressly 
sanctioned by the Guides.27 
Irrespective of the meaning of the second condition to comparisons 
with similar goods, it is clear that it is deceptive to compare goods made 
of less expensive material or inferior design with those having greater 
consumer acceptance.2S \\Thether any type of comparison is allowable 
between a "budget product" and a "deluxe model" of the same type 
is not clear. Also somewhat obscure, except in the more obvious cases, 
is the question of how inferiority is to be determined.� 
(1960) stated that reliance on the manufacturer's a5�crtion of value in a Life Magazine 
adyertisement did not justify use of the mentioned price as the value of the product when 
the seller did not know of any retailers who normally c-'mctcd that price. 
23. George's Radio & Television Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ": 15691 (FTC Orders) (Jan. 
19,1962). 
24. Guides Against Deceptiye Pricing, supra note 4, at 12903. 
25. The Guides expressly allow a disclaimer only as to the l:15t condition: U[S]aid fiml 
and comparable merchandise is generally available for purch:15e at the comparative price 
in the same trade area, or areas, where the claim is made, or, if not HI available, that 
fact is clearly disclosed." Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, supra note 4, at 12903. The other 
conditions are stated without consideration of alternatives. But ECC note 17 Eupra and ac­
compan:ying text. 
26. See note 22 supra and accompanying te.,t. 
27. The only ouggestion made in the Guides is: "Dacron suit $20.0O-Comparable suits 
$25.00." Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, supra note 4, at 12903. 
28. Barsam Distrib., Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (Iez3 
expensive perfume); l\Iichigan Bulb Co., 54 F.T.C. 1329 (1953) (inferior nu�cry stock); 
l\Iarket Tire Co., 53 F.T.C. 668 (1957) (used tires compared to price of new tirC3). 
29. A problem arises because the Commission finds value and current sclng price 
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The retailer must exercise some caution in advertising a comparison 
between his present prices and those which he formerly charged. He 
certainly may not offer a product for a time at a price beyond what he 
expects to receive and then announce a reduction from his former price,uo 
He also may not compare his present price to any previous price other 
than the one that he was receiving at the time of the advertised reduc­
tion.31 An appropriate vocabulary for making the type of comparison 
here discussed is provided above.32 In this type of comparison as well 
as in the one previously discussed, the retailer must take care to show 
"clearly" whether he is claiming a reduction from his prior prices or 
from the prices that were customary in the trade area.aa 
Finally, the retailer must beware 'Of using the price of similar, though 
not identical, goods as a standard of valuation for his product. In the 
recent 11ary Carter Paint Co. case/4 a "buy one, get one free" adver­
tisement was interdicted because the price of the "one" to be purchased 
had not been established at a time when the "other" was being given 
away. The Commission held that the hearing examiner was correct in 
ruling that proof 'Of the area price of comparable quality paint was irrel­
evant. Thus, although the respondent offered to prove that the price 
charged accurately represented the usual area price of one can of paint, 
the Federal Trade Commission decided that the only means of establish­
ing "customary retail price" was by proof of the prior price of the re­
spondent's paint. Since the case turns on the "truth" of the assertion of 
value of the first can, the rule of the case could boil down to a simple 
formula: (1) it is improper to assert value as being that of nonidentical 
goods (at least where there is no accompanying explanation); (2) similar 
goods of like quality are nonidentical if they bear different brand names. 
If this formula is followed, it would seem that newly introduced goods 
would have no acceptable "value" and that the price of each brand of a 
synonymous. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. The very fact that the seller's 
product has been sold at a lower price for a period of time may be sufficient to suggest 
"inferiority" if the products are not identical. See, e.g., Chicago Invisible Contact Lens 
Serv., 52 F.T.C. 781 (1956) where the trial examiner found that the claimed "value" was 
false since there was no evidence to establish any sum due to wide variations in pricing in 
this field. Id. at 785. 
30. Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, supra note 4, list the following prerequisites to 
comparisons to one's former selling prices: (1) the saving or reduction statement must 
apply to a specifically identified product and not to similar or comparable merchandise; 
(2) the indicated reduction must be a reduction from "the advertiser's usual and customary 
retail price of the article in the recent, regular course of business"; (3) the comparison 
must be clearly ascribed to former prices. Id. at 12907. 
31. Ibid.; J. C. Winter & Co., 31 F.T.C. 824 (1940). 
32. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. 
33. Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, supra note 4, at 12907. 
34. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. n 15968 (FTC Orders) (June 28, 1962). 
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product, no matter how far it varied from the price of otherwise identical 
goods, would become its only "value." It would also seem to follow that a 
product being reduced to attract customers to a store or being sold in a 
"sale" of any substantial duration would lose "value" if it were not held to 
a higher "value" by other stores. On the other hand, it is possible that 
the case is merely an indication of a stricter policy on assertions of "free" 
merchandise.�:; 
III. THE HONEST REPRESENTATION OF OFFERING PRICE 
Even the retailer's indication of the price for which the goods are going 
to be sold is fraught with the possibility of misrepresentation under the 
Federal Trade Commission's standard. For the same reasons that price 
lists which over-price goods are held deceptive, the use of manufacturer­
supplied tickets or other price markings which do not represent the price 
that wil be demanded is held deceptive.all In fact, any indication of 
price becomes deceptive when the price is not charged in a substantial 
number of transactions.31 An allied problem is faced in "giving goods 
away." The use of the word "free," while probably never literally true 
in a commercial setting, is not prohibited. Goods, which are not uncon­
ditionally given away gratis, must be conspicuously marked! however, 
to indicate the conditions which wil activate the gift.�9 In no event may 
the gift be financed by raising the price of a product which must be 
bought as a condition precedent to obtaining the "free" item"O or by 
lowering the quality, quantity or size of a tied purchase:10 
As previously mentioned, the advertising seller may not indicate a 
higher price for the required purchase than one which has been estab­
lished for that specific item at a time when no other product was being 
35. Commis>ioner Elman also thought the opinion a bit difficult to under:;tand, at least 
insofar as it relates to offering "free" merchandise. He stated, I/[Hlow v.il a l:m"Yct' 
answer a client who asks: 'l\Iay I ad\'erilie something as "rri!()" to purch:u:ers 'I';ho buy 
another article at a stated price, if the adverilicment clearly di.!:clo�es al the terms and 
conditions of the offer?' The only safe answer would seem to be: 'I don't l:now. I've 
read all the Commission opinions on the subject, and I still don't know. 'What's mor� I 
don't think the Commi."on knows!" Mary Carter Paint Co., supra note 34, at ZQ�15 
(dissenting opinion). 
36. See Curtis Bros., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. IT 23480 (FTC Orders) (1959). 
37. Clinton Watch Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1961), ccrt. denied, 3tiS U.s. 
952 (1962). 
38. See Federal Trade Commi.<>ion's Trade Practice Conference Rules rclea!:cd on 
December 3, 1953, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. IT 40210, for the use of the word "Free." Prior to 
1953, the Commi.<5ion allowed the word to be used only when the girt was not conditioned 
on any other act. See ROEenblum v. FTC, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951). 
39. Ba>ic Books, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 19(0). 
40. American Photographic Soc'y, 54 F.T.C. 524 (957); fce also Federal Trade 
Commis5ion's Trade Practice Conference Rules, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. IT 4101S-rr 41227; e.S .. 
Commercial Dental Lab. Indus., Rul. 3(b), 16 C.F.R. IS.8(b) (1960). 
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given away with it. Consequently, if a product has always been sold 
at area prices with a "free" companion as a bonus to the customer, the 
price should be attributed to both products and one may not be classi� 
fied as "free."41 Advertising prices, which indicate that the buyer will 
be able to procure the good in question for less than he will actually have 
to pay, are also deceptive.42 Thus, failure to indicate the applicability 
of service charges, credit costs or other comparable expenses makes 
advertising deceptive.43 Similarly, such familiar sights as the "David" 
sized price standing next to the "Goliath" sized price is an insufficient 
qualifier to avoid the charge of deceptive price advertising.44 
IV. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF HONESTY AND COMPETITION 
Chairman Dixon of the Federal Trade Commission has pointed out at 
least one relationship between competition and honesty in advertising.4G 
The dishonest seller may have an unjustified advantage over his more 
trustworthy competitor. Such advantage is indefensible socially and 
economically. The fact that little is to be gained by funnelling effort 
into competition via imaginative deception can hardly be denied. At 
the other extreme, the right of a seller to advertise his genuine ad­
vantages, quite aside from its free speech implications,4o is a necessary 
condition to effective competition. It follows that a restriction which 
avoids the possibility of deception may, if it also muzzles honest declara­
tions, become anticompetitive. Furthermore, the risk of anticompetitive 
restrictions varies directly with the competitive usefulness of the informa� 
tion suppressed. Reconciliation of the competitive and honesty standards 
in price advertisement is made more difficult than it might appear on the 
surface by two factors. First, a great deal of advertising is conducted 
in slogans, jingles and short phrases. A large "28" with a miniscule "9'> 
on a sign in front of a gas station informs the passer�by that the price 
of gasoline is twenty-eight and nine-tenths cents per gallon. "Fifty per 
41. Mary Carter Paint Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. U 15968 (FTC Orders) (June 28, 1962). 
42. General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 
682 (1941) (6% credit offered when, by normal computation, the amount would exceed 
12%) j cf. American Hosp. & Life Ins. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1100 (1956) (overstatement of 
benefits offered). 
43. Fire Safety Servs., Inc., 54 F.T.C. 1173 (1958). 
44. See, e.g., Lifetime, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. U 15590 (FTC Orders) (Dec. 8, 1961). 
45. See report of speech by Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman of Federal Trade Commission, 
to Advertising Federation of America in Washington, D.C., N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1962, 
p. 48, col. 3. 
46. The Federal Trade Commission holds that free speech guarantees arc inappllcablc 
to false advertising. Witkower Press, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. U 28953 (FTC Orders) (1960). 
False claims by one not engaged in the sale of the product discussed raise more difficult 
problems. E. F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956) (interdiction unconsti� 
tutional-dictum) . 
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cent 'Off" on a tag asserts a reduction of one half from a former price. 
"Free" signifies, at least under some conditions, that the product in­
dicated is obtainable without extra charge. The fact that communication 
may take place in such symbolic forms reduces the effectiveness of 
elaborate disclaimers in indicating deviation from a standard meaning.4i 
Secondly, the Federal Trade Commission has announced that advertising 
is to be considered deceptive if it is capable of deceiving even the most 
credulous.4s Such solicitude, of course, also tends towards a more con­
stricted range of permissible expression. 
V. HONEST VALUATION AND CO:lETITION 
As previously noted,49 there has been no attempt to channel forms 
<of valuation advertising into any predetermined modes. Instead, the 
present uses have been individually attacked when found to be capable 
of creating deception. The absence of affirmative encouragement rather 
than negative sanction is understandable. The Federal Trade Commis­
sion has the right to prohibit unfair and deceptive advertisint'.J but not 
the corollary duty of making it competitive. It would seem, however, 
that in evaluating deception, the Commission should also consider the 
<other major responsibility given to it.til The mere absence of sanction 
for favored forms of advertising, not to mention actual commendation in 
the Guides, would certainly amount to some encouragement. 
One of the forms of valuation advertising that is not as common as 
the others discussed is advertisement of the cost of the product. To 
date, the Commission has not issued as many complaints in this area 
as in some others/2 though it is not possible to determine whether this is 
due to infrequency 'Of use or conscious Commission abstention. Cer­
tainly, the application of the accounting rigor evidenced in the Robinson­
Patman areau3 would have made it possible to classify all present cost 
advertising as fraudulent in some particular. 
In terms of giving customers useful information, cost data would 
47. General :Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1940), ccrt. denied, 312 US. 
682 (19·n). 
48. The CommL<sion has insisted upon, and the courts have approved, a ftandard of 
advertL<ing "clear enough 50 that, in the words of the prophet fuUah, 'wayfarins men, 
though fools, shall not err therein • • .  .''' Id. at 36. 
49. See note 4 supra and accompanying te.n. 
50. See the statutes cited in note 1 supra with the e."'\ception of the Clayton Act. 
51. The grant of power to prohibit anticompetitive conduct is �kctched in nota 2 rupro. 
52. The Trade Regulation Reporter identifies only nine docl.etcd cost misrepresentation 
-cases, and each of these was found deceptive because of a falEe claim that f:Uas were being 
made below cost. 2 Trade Reg. Rep. IT 7335, at 12681. 
53. See United States v. Borden Co., 370 US. 460 (1962) j Tal!�rd, Cost Justification 
(1959). A good brief discussion of the whole problem as 'I':ell as the Troda Commi£sion's 
'viewpoint may be found in Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 170-76 (1955). 
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seem to have several advantages over the other types considered. First, 
cost information is unlikely to be otherwise available, whereas price 
comparisons of similar products are obtainable if the customer is diligent 
and interested. Secondly, for some customers, the knowledge of the 
retailer's costs provides a good idea of how the product should be priced 
at retail. Where the retail price is determined by bargaining between 
buyer and seller, knowledge of cost gives the buyer a better basis for 
making his offer than does a system of valuation based on a more arbi­
trary standard. Where the price is firm, it might have the same effect 
through customer reaction to what might be considered too high a mark­
up. Cost knowledge would also facilitate comparisons between a wider 
range of goods since the standard of valuation applicable to both would 
have a common basis. For the reasons suggested, retailers' cost infor­
mation would seem to aid the consumer in making economical purchases. 
There is, of course, no necessary connection between the retailers' 
cost and value since there is no legal requirement that the cost of the 
manufacturer correspond in any given manner to the price which is 
charged the retailers. On the other hand, as between the retailers as 
a group and the consumers, it is safe to assert a greater likelihood of an 
appropriate price level being set by the former. The Robinson-Patman 
Act requirements also tend, in many industries, to pass on to the less 
informed retailers the buying expertise of the larger stores since the 
manufacturer must often avoid price discrimination among them.M 
It is true, however, that requiring cost information might overbalance 
the consumer's position. Certainly, to the extent that it places pressure 
on the retailers to make their prices correspond to cost plus a reasonable 
profit percentage, it would require them to do something that has not 
been legislatively required of any group that has not correspondingly 
been assured of a profit.55 At any rate, there seems to be no statutory 
authority, state or federal, requiring the disclosure of costs for such 
ends except in industries with regulated prices. The primary state con­
cern with costs seems to lie in assuring that goods will not be sold too 
54. It is unlawful to sell similar products to different purchasers in commerce at dif­
ferent prices (except insofar as the difference is cost-justified) when there is a significllnl 
anticompetitive effect of one of certain specified types. Robinson-Patmlln Act § 2 (a). 
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961). 
55. On the other hand, it is a hallmark of utility regulation to allow not only a rellsonable 
profit on the invested funds but also to maintain prices at levels which can produce thllt 
profit. For a succinct description of utility pricing see Schwartz, Free Enterprise and Economic 
Organization 914-18 (2d ed. 1959); but cf. De Gorter v. FTC, 244 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 
1957), affirming sub nom. PeIta Furs, Trade Reg. Rep. IT 26006 (FTC Orders) (1956). 
This action was brought under the Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 175 (1951), 15 
U.S.C. § 69 (1958). The Commission found price tags deceptive in part beclluse prices in­
dicated did not have a systematic relationship to cost. 
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inexpensively under the Sales Below Cost statutes.GO Interestingly, neither 
the Fair Trade laws which allow the fixing of retail prices under some 
circumstances,u7 nor the former wartime price regulation which fi."ed 
retail prices generally,US require a correspondence of the selling price 
and cost. 
An assertion by the manufacturer, the retailer 'Or any intermediary, 
that the "Usual price elsewhere is ........ ," is a statement of fact. Hence, 
there would seem to be little justification for aUowing a misstatement of 
that fact. If the information required to make the assertion is absent, 
alternative forms of advertising would seem to be a more appropriate 
standard of value than a guess at what others are charging. 
The difculties involved in determining the retail price that is actually 
being asked by competitors, while avoiding any agreement with them 
relating to price,09 raises substantial problems in many industries. With 
al the problems which beset this type of advertising, however, a truthful 
statement concerning the present market price in the general area, if 
reliable, would be helpful to consumers. Although the alternative of 
comparison shopping does not present an insurmountable obstacle (espe­
cially in goods which are customarily sold at the same price to all cus­
tomers), it is an annoyance which might lead some buyers to patronize 
the first store. The competitive effect, one way or the other, however, 
would seem small except to the extent that a false valuation based on 
fictitious area prices brings unwarranted business to the advertiser. 
Price lists are another matter. ,\Vhile treated as identical to assertions 
of normal retail price,GO they probably are not so understood by a large 
56. For a list of various state pro\isions �ce Sales Bela\': Co::t-StateL::lw5, 2 Trade 
Reg. Rep. IT 6571-l[ 6581. 
57. See McGuire Fair Trade Act, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.s.C. § 45(a) (2)-(6) (1958) 
(authorizing state fair trade laws on certain conditions). A typical state act is N.Y. Gen. 
Bus. Law § 369-a to -e. No mention is made in either statute of bow the price to be 
maintained is to be determined. Note, however, the pro\iso in the McGuire Act �tates 
that the goods fair-traded be "in free and open competition \�ith commodities of the �(l 
general class" thus apparently relying on competitive prC5sures to dctcrmine pri'I:. cr. GuU 
Oil Corp. v. Mays, 401 Pa. 413, 164 A.2d 656 (1960) where the court on its own motion in­
validated a fair trade agreement for gasoline under the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act, Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §§ 7-8. The court found that there was no free (Qmp�titiQn between brands. 
58. The Price Administrator was permitted to "C5tabllih such • • •  ma.'imum prices as 
in his judgment [were] • . .  fair and equitable . . . •  So far as practicable • • •  the pricC3 pre­
vailing between October 1 and October 15, 1941 • • . .  " 56 Stat. 24 (1942). See Hynnin�, Price 
Control and the Profit System, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 561 (1942). 
59. Except as provided in fair trade legislation, supra note 57, agre(?ments as to retail 
prices in interstate commerce 'dolate the Sherman Act. United States v. Trenton Potteries 
Co., 273 U.s. 392 (1927). In intrastate commerce, they may constitute \iohtiollS of 
applicable state antitrust laws. E.g., People v. Milk Exch., Ltd.) 145 N.Y. 267, 39 N.E. 
1062 (1895). 
60. George's Radio & TeIe\ision Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. IT 15691 (FTC Orders) (Jan. 
19, 1962). 
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segment of the consuming pUblic. At the very least, it would seem a 
safe hypothesis that consumers believe that price lists do not represent 
the invariable sales price for expensive commodities and that discount 
houses might be expected to sell below list prices. The Federal Trade 
Commission's position that lists must represent the normal retail price 
in the trade area,61 essentially, means that goods which are sold at two 
price levels cannot be valued by the list price method. Continued pres­
sure in this direction will probably result in the abandonment of list 
pricing in industries in which discount houses represent alternate outlets. 
Even in industries in which discounting is not the norm, price listst 
suggested retail prices and the like may turn out to be deceptive under 
the present standard. It is, after all, not the good faith in which a state­
ment is made, but the correctness of the statement that is determinative 
of its legal acceptability.62 For the manufacturer, keeping track of the 
price charged by retailers presents a number of problems, many of which 
center on the prohibition against retail price maintenance.oa Although 
duality of action is a prerequisite to a conviction under the applicable 
federal antitrust provision,64 many acts which would facilitate obtaining 
the type of information required for accurate statements concerning 
prices charged would also help toward establishing duality. For example, 
any agreement made between the manufacturer and retailer which pro­
vided that notification must be given to the former prior to the latter's 
changing the price previously charged, would smack of price-fixing.Ol 
Certainly, a wholesaler's or retailer's agreement to identify those who 
are selling below suggested prices to the manufacturer would indicate 
questionable legal judgment in light of FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co .oo. 
Although unilateral price maintenance is not an impossible goal for a 
manufacturer, it is a difficult one.07 Short of price maintenance or close 
policing, it might be troublesome to obtain the information on which a 
list claim could be made, at least so long as list price means area seIling 
price. Finally, it should be noted that an accurate list (one which truly 
corresponds with the retail sales price) may be found to be an element in 
establishing duality in "fixing" the resale price.os 
61. Id. at 20525. 
62. Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953). The court approved the Commission's 
interdiction of claims that certain medicinal preparations were effective against a large 
range of diseases despite the good faith of the respondent. 
63. See note 59 supra. 
64. Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). This 
section prohibits a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade. . . ..> 
65. Cf. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936). 
66. 257 U.S. 441 (1922). 
67. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), aff'd on remand, 365 U.S. 
125 (1961) (per curiam). 
68. United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah 1962). 
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The Federal Trade Commission's reasoning is that if the price lists 
represent fictitiously high valuations, the lists will deceh'e the customers 
as to the saving to be realized.GrI That some list prices are apparently 
prepared with this objective in mind is undeniable. On the other hand, 
there are some virtues in valuations by way of price lists that may have 
been overlooked. To the extent that the lists represent a set amount of 
markup, it is possible for the customer to value \'arious models put out 
by a single manufacturer without comparative shopping at all. To the 
extent that different manufacturers in the same industry tend toward a 
similar markup, the consumer can compare values without the necessity 
of discovering the best available discount on each model first. The lists 
can provide a guide to lending institutions accepting chattels as collateral 
or making loans to finance them. It is even possible for lists to hold 
down prices by preventing dealers from overcharging customers, though 
this would seem uncommon in present trade practice. 
There may be little reason for allowing a manufacturer to produce a 
list with prices which he is reasonably certain none of the retailers of 
his products is going to charge. Even more objectionable is the price list 
series in which there are multiple lists available, so that one list can be 
custom tailored to the gullibility of the shopper .iQ It makes little differ­
ence if instead of accomplishing this result through multiple lists, the 
seller provides tickets with varying prices to accommodate the vagaries 
of his buyer's customers.n If, however, the price list has some relation­
ship to what a dealer might be expected to charge an average customer, 
then it facilitates the types of comparisons suggested above and, even 
more significantly, gives a customer a good idea of the variance in price 
between various retailers. Not only may identical models be compared 
for price, but whole ranges of goods may also be considered in light of the 
percentage that wil be allowed below list. Conversely, making the 
promulgation of list prices, the use of pre-ticketing and 'Other similar 
devices more difficult, may actually assist the higher markup stores by 
removing the guidance given to the consumer by these devices. 
Finally, there is the problem of other assertions of value for the 
product. Certainly, the price presently charged for it and its cost are not 
the only criteria 'Of value. Even a very strict valuation standard considers 
69. Baltimore Luggage Co., Trade Reg. Rep. II 29462 (FTC Order;;), afi'd, :!9li F.zd LQS 
(4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 860 (1962). 
70. 'While no Commission action on multiple price lists was found, the practice is 
clearly interdicted by the requirement that lists conform to the current retail price in the 
trade area. George's Radio & Television Co., 3 Trade Re:;. Rep. II 15691 (FTC Orders) 
(Jan. 19, 1962). That such lists e...ast ,,:as discovered by the author in a short field !'tudy 
of fraudulent installment sales contracts in Chicago. See   Frouduknt Instalent 
Sales in Chicago, 41 Chi. B. Rec. 285 (1960). 
71. Raye.;: Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. !l 15823 (FTC Orders) (April 2, 1962). 
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what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller rather than the actual 
amount that passed on the last transaction.72 The variation in standard 
makes a significant difference if the goods have not been previously sold 
in the relevant market or if the market conditions are temporarily de­
pressed. Retail prices are a significant factor for the consumer, but value 
and cost are not synonymous. If a seller wants to assert that a product 
he sells is worth five dollars because that is the usual valuation of goods 
which accomplish the same purpose or because it represents a relation­
ship to the price presently commanded by inferior goods or superior 
goods, there would seem to be nothing necessarily untruthful in his re­
marks. If he wants to assert that the goods are worth a higher amount 
than the market presently indicates because of an over-supply, labor 
.difficulties, or other circumstances, he will probably add information and 
perhaps bring another product under competitive pressure by his com­
parison. Actual deception could be treated as a separate problem. Cer­
tainly, it should be unobjectionable for him to claim as "value," the usual 
retail price of a product that differs only in brand name. 
VI. PRICE COMPARISON AND COMPETITION 
As noted above,73 the seller is quite limited in his representations of 
the relationship of his price for goods, list prices, the price charged by 
others or his own prior prices. It has already been suggested that there 
may be some good reasons for allowing comparisons to list prices, even 
if those prices are not guaranteed to be the prices charged by substan­
tially all of the competitors.74 It should also be noted that requiring the 
retailer to be conversant with his competitors' actual practices may be 
no more realistic than requiring the same thing of the manufacturer. A 
good retailer will almost certainly know the price being charged by some 
of his competitors. However, if there are many sellers in the same trade 
area and he is able to account for the price charged by substantially all 
of them, that fact itself may suggest an uncompetitive retailing of the 
product. Nothing done under the standard of honesty ought to increase 
the need for a retailer to police the pricing practices of his competitors. 
As far as comparisons to the products sold by others is concerned, the 
present requirement of substantial identity of products before comparison 
is allowed75 seems distinctly anticompetitive. Certainly, it is important 
72. "[T]he word 'value', when not qualified by the context or circumstances, has often 
been defined as meaning 'market value', which is not what the owner would realize nt n 
forced sale, but the price he could obtain after reasonable and ample time, such as would 
{lrdinarily be taken by an owner to make a sale of like property." Wade v. Rathbun, 
23 Cal. App. 2d 758, 760, 67 P.2d 765, 766 (App. Dep't 1937). 
73. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text. 
74. See text following note 69. 
75. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
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to prevent fraudulent claims of equality in comparisons, and there seems 
to be no reason for allowing-a seller of books to compare a cheaply 
bound edition of books to one more luxuriously bound without indicating 
the difference,7t> the claim of identity between a coat and an inutation of  
it  made of  "seconds, ni l  or a false claim that the seller's perfume is  regu­
larly sold in "better shops" for a certain price.'lS Such deception� how­
ever, is far removed from comparisons to products which are only slightly 
different from the one sold. The identity requirement, in the latter con­
text, in essence, is the comparison rule, i.c., a seller may compare his 
goods to similar goods of others, even if they are not identical, if he Catz, 
prove that the goods are of equal value.'3 Advertising has already made 
too many products unique, for reasons having nothing to do vnth the 
useful features of the product, to prevent comparisons between largely 
identical goods. A seller ought to be encouraged to make comparisons 
with products for which he believes his can be substituted so that they 
are not artificially isolated from competition. Except in areas ", .. here 
there is general agreement on value (as in the case of the difference be­
tween virgin wool and seconds) ,  it probably should be the consumer 
who decides the legitimacy of the comparison, and not the Federal Trade 
Commission. Even where the compared product is clearly inferior, a seller 
ought to be allowed to make his comparison if he clearly states the 
difference between the goods. This would appear to be an area in which 
the Commission right take a cautious case-by-case approach and in 
which it right allow all comparisons except those which it can demon­
strate are unreasonable. 
Finally, in the area of price comparison to other retailers' goods, one is 
struck by the Orwellian linUtation of the language approved.Eo Of all 
76. Gold IiledaI Books, Inc., 27 F.T.C. 1304 (1938). 
77. LeAn Fine Furs, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1404 (1956) (Fur Products I.:lbelins Act \iolation) . 
78. HarEam Distrib., Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam). 
79. This results from the fact that the Commis�ion. once ha\ins found value and 
current retail price assertions to be identical, can make out a �c by proof that: (1) the 
products are not identical and (2) that the price listed as \-ruue is not the prie\! which 
has been regularly recehoed for the advermed product. Sec note 29 supra and accomp:my­
ing te.,t. Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.) , ccrt. denied, 364 U.s. 833 
(1960). The advermer must then prove his "\-ruue" �-"ertion. See the critici.<m or the 
sparsity of the Commission's evidence presented in Nire.;:l;. Indus., Inc. Y. FTC, supra at 
340-41 ; d. the Commission's regulation under the Fur Products I.:lbcling Act: Ut c) Xo 
person shall, with respect to a fur or fur product, ad\'erilie such fur or fur product as 
being 'made to sel for', being 'worth' or '\'alued at' a certain price, or by !'imilar �tate­
ments, unles such claim or representation is true in fact • • • •  (e) PcrEons maIdnt; pricing 
claims or representations of the types described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and Cd) of 
this section shall maintain full and adequate records �cloEing the facts upon which such 
claims or representations are based." 16 CFR § 3 01.44(c), (c) (1960). 
so. See note 21 supra and accompan�ing te.,t. 
156 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31 
forms of expressing the idea, the only one sanctioned is-"Comparable 
Value.,,81 It would be interesting to test the meaning of those words 
against the meaning of such prohibited words as "Usually" and "Regu-
1arly" to see which best communicate the thought of price comparison. 
Probably more people would understand the use of "Comparable" as a 
way of hedging inferiority to the compared good than either of the other 
two words. Also more people would probably agree that the latter two, 
i.e., "Usually" and "Regularly," relate to the price charged by others 
or by the advertising store, than would consider them to be limited to the 
store's prior prices. 
Again, in the area of comparison to prices formerly charged by the 
same retailer, the requirement that there must be an identity of goods 
-causes some competitive problems. There is less reason to allow the re­
tailer to assert that goods formerly sold for a certain price are now 
reduced when he is discussing two different items than there is to allow 
him to compare his product to a competitor's different product. On the 
other hand, where the goods are of comparable value, such comparison 
may be a good way of indicating that there is a reduction in cost to the 
-consumer. In fact, by the use of such comparisons, a seller may indicate 
his present sale of a competitor's product which is very similar but suffi­
ciently different to avoid unfair competition charges. If allowing the 
retailer to overlook slight differences in the products for advertising pur­
poses will facilitate his changing to the competitor's product when it is 
less expensive, and if that saving is passed on to the consumer, there 
would seem to be rea-sonable grounds for a change in the rule. When the 
variance between the two is more than miniscule, however, there prob­
ably ought to be some note of qualification, e.g., "similar" made an 
integral part of the ad. 
VII. OFFERING PRICE AND COMPETITION 
It is apparently a common practice in some lines to mark goods with 
a price but to depend on bargaining to establish selling price. In other 
outlets, any customer receives, on demand, a predetermined percentage 
off the marked price reduction. These and other discrepancies between 
the price marked and the price normally received by the stores are inter­
dicted by the Federal Trade Commission.82 They are found deceptive 
either in convincing the customer that he is getting a reduction from the 
normal price or in extracting a price from him that is not usually ex­
pected.83 Whether the retailer or the manufacturer is responsible for the 
81. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
82. Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, supra note 4. 
83. De Gorter v. FTC, 244 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1957) (Fur Products Lnbellng Act 
violation); cf. FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937), reversing 86 F.2d 692 
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price tag is, for this purpose, irrelevant.s.1 
A number of rather difcult problems are raised in this area. For 
example, how much basis is there for the assumption, made by the Fed­
eral Trade Commission, that the price marked on the goods is a repre­
sentation of the price which the dealer commands for the product rather 
than, for example, the price he would like to obtain. 'Vhile there are a 
large number of goods that are routinely sold at the marked price, there 
are many other products sold only after some bargaining between the 
customer and the dealer. In the latter type of circumstance, might the 
price ticket not as legitimately represent the opening offer rather than an 
expectation of ultimate sales price? Since one would expect any variation 
of the selling price to be a reduction from the marked price, and, conse­
quently, would expect the dealer t'O readily accept the marked price, is it 
deceptive to indicate that willingness in advance? In this area, unlike 
the two prior ones, the issue asserted is not the speculative one of valua­
tion or the factual assertion of area or former prices. Here the dealer is 
indicating something quite subjective-the price which he would accept 
for the goods. Is predetermined inconsistency as to that price deceptive 
in fact as well as in law? The answer would seem to lie in an examination 
of the understanding that the consuming public has of price tags. 
The writer would surmise that the general understanding concerning 
price tags is that the price on the tag is expected by the seller. If that 
guess is proven accurate, the Federal Trade Commission would be justi­
fied in its determination. If so, what may the dealer do, who is not in a 
position to set the price without some bargaining? He may, of course, 
not indicate any price on the goods and avoid the problem. Though un­
common except in noncommercial settings, he may indicate an opening 
price and his wilgness to bargain. Finally, he may set a firm price, 
indicate the price on a ticket and abandon his old method of doing busi­
ness. It is the pressure to do the last that seems to raise the major 
economic problem. 
It is not at al clear whether a price fi..�ed by bargaining with individual 
customers is more attuned t'O the competitive goal than predetermining 
a price which wil be charged of all customers. At other levels of pro­
duction, the competition for customers and among customers is supposed 
to accomplish a reduction of the retail price by forcing the various 
processors and distributors to be as efficient as possible. One wonders, 
however, whether any su� desirable goals are achieved by having con-
(2d Cir. 1936) which had held that the Commission 'was unwarranted in find1ns that 
deceptiye practices bad dh'erted business to the respondent. 
84. See, e.g., De Gorter v. FTC, 244 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1957) (retailer) j Top Form 
Mil, Inc., 55 F.T.C. 807 (1958) (manufacturers) j Fry King Corp., SS F.T.C. 113 (1958) 
(manufacturers) • 
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sumers compete with each other for a lower price for themselves. The 
net result of one person's bargaining skill will not necessarily be made 
available to the next person. The next person may even have to pay a 
higher price to compensate for the lack of profit from the previous cus­
tomer. The communication, which assists commercial buyers in finding 
the best price for their goods, may not operate to identify the best outlets 
for consumers. Furthermore, the knowledgeability which is assumed to 
characterize the buyer for a retailer may not be present in the consumer. 
Lack of knowledge would seem to put him at a competitive disadvantage 
to a bargaining dealer. Perhaps, indeed, the whole movement from caveat 
emptor to the present state of the law has been somewhat motivated by 
the desire to protect the consumer from the consequences of his lack of 
knowledge. If so, it may be the seller's duty to indicate a fair price for 
the goods (or at least a price which he thinks he can obtain from a num­
ber of purchasers) in the same manner as he must inform the buyer of 
other considerations which might influence his purchase.81i Furthermore, 
inability to bargain may have a good competitive influence. For example, 
knowledge that the posted price is reliable greatly facilitates comparative 
shopping. To the extent that a seller is likely to use a similar markup 
on his goods, a dependable price allows a consumer to judge the reason­
ableness of the general pricing structure of the store by a comparison 
to the prices of goods with which he is familiar. Both types of com­
parisons would appear to allow consumers as a group to make effective 
economic choices and should, consequently, be competitive. On the other 
hand, the responsiveness of a market price which is set by direct bargain­
ing would seem to avoid the problems of conscious parallelism in retail­
ing86 and would apparently accelerate the response to changes in demand. 
A related, but not identical, problem is the one of granting a discount 
from a regularly established price to some, but not all, of the customers. 
85. 1 CaIlman, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 334-38 (2d cd. 1950) (general 
duty of disclosure) . CaIlman states that a "purchaser may reasonably expect that prices 
are competitive, and he should be informed when they are not." Id. at 432. His view­
point has yet to be adopted by the courts and the Federal Trade Commission. 
86. Conscious paraIlelism refers to price imitation by competitors. Because of the 
duality required under the applicable Sherman Act provisions, truly independent conduct 
is not a violation of federal antitrust law. See note 64 supra and accompanying text ; sec 
also Att'y Gen. Nat'! Comm. Antitrust Rep. 36-42 (1955) ; Delaware Valley Marino Supply 
Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961 ) .  The resulting prico main­
tenance is in many ways indistinguishable from the results of contractual price fixing. 
The Federal Trade Commission has been greatly concerned with the problem. Sec tho 
consent order in Rubber Mfg. Ass'n, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. U 15657 (FTC Orders) (Jan. 11, 
1962) . The order provides that the fourteen tire and tube manufacturers "must abandon 
[their] existing prices, independently furnish new ones, and furnish documentary proof 
to the FTC upon request that any changes after adoption were a good faith meeting of 
competition." Id. at 20494. 
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Again, this practice is apparently forbidden by the Federal Trade Com­
mission.s7 l\Iany of the considerations are the same as those applied 
to the desirability of having some advertised price, but there are sev­
eral important differences. In the first place, under this type of pricing 
the general consumer is getting a price which is apparently satis­
factory to a number of his fellow shoppers. His inability to bargain costs 
him only the discount. Furthermore, there may be economic reasons for 
singling out certain customers for special prices. The purchaser who 
makes large purchases, the one who can be induced to buy all his require­
ments from one store by some financial arrangement, the person in a 
position to recommend the store to others, all might be appropriate re­
cipients of discount privileges. \Vhile such favoritism might result in the 
continuation of a higher price to the general public, the seller should not 
be able to pass on the loss of profit on his special accounts since his usual 
price is already likely to represent the highest price that could be ob­
tained. In some instances, the fact that a reduction was achieved by 
some of the buyers might spur others, upon finding out about the arrange­
ment, to seek similar discounts. The net result might be tantamount to a 
general price reduction. 
Prohibiting the advertising of a price not uniformly maintained has 
a tendency to stabilize retail prices. If a retailer must charge one price 
to all, it must be a price sufficient to insure a profit. At least there is 
less motivation for lowering the price. 
Actually, whether economically sound or not, the legislatures and 
courts have been quite clear that customers must be treated equally e."i:­
cept under the most compelling circumstances. In the regulated industries 
there are normally specific restrictions against favoring one customer 
over another, and they are often quite strictly enforced.s9 Gaining com­
mercial advantage by giving value for a recommendation or other influ­
ence in an activity which is not recognized as capable of purchase, is 
often criminal.S9 Giving a quantity discount to attract customers that 
is not justified by incident economies, if of sufficient geographic and 
economic stature, appears to be a violation of the Robinson-Patman ActO!) 
87. See, e.g., Lasky Enterprises, No. 7408, FTC, April 27, 1960. 
SS. E.g., Interstate Commerce Commission Act § 3, 24 Stat. 3EO (1837), as amended, 
49 U.S.C. § 3 (1) (195S) ; Federal Aviation Act § 404, 72 Stat. 760 (1958), 49 U.s.c. 
§ 1374(b) (1958) ; Wil v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 191m 
($5,000 e."!:emplary damages and $1.54 compen..oatory damages �m"'3rdcd p��engcr removed 
from overbooked flight in favor of higher tariff passenger) • 
89. E.g., Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935), as amended, 27 
U.s.C. § 205(c) (1958). For a llCU5sion of state 13\':5 prohibiting "commercial bribIlZY'" 
see Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1248 (1932),  Note, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1928). 
90. Robinson-Patman Act § 2 (a), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936). 15 U.s.C. § 13(0.) (I!lS3) 
(Supp. m, 1959-1961) prohibits price differentials that are not cost justified ''bctwCCl 
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although the act has not been enforced in retail pricing cases. The en­
forcement of the antideception provisions in this area is consistent with 
legislative egalitarianism irrespective of whether it is economically sound. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
It has not been the purpose of this article to predict the economic effect 
of various policies in the Federal Trade Commission's enforcement of the 
antideception provisions in the Federal Trade Commission Act.01 Rather, 
it has been to point out that there is a problem in balancing this effort 
against the goals of a competitive economy. The relationship is more 
complex than the suggestion of the Chairman of the Commission would 
indicate.1l2 Deception, as it has been defined by the Commission, encom­
passes many assertions which have a purpose other than the stealing of 
customers from competitors by false representations. It may be that the 
rarefied vocabulary being urged by the Commission will have the effect 
of making it more difficult to communicate basic facts which customers 
need to know in order to make the proper economic choice. Worse yet, 
the Commission may succeed in making it less profitable to advertise 
merit at all and, consequently, drive advertising stores further in the 
direction of emotional appeals. There is nothing deceptive about a 
comely young lady driving a bicycle, but her figure does not compensate 
the consumer for obscuring the bicycle's price figures. This is no better 
than if the retailer were to give up advertising all together. 
Whatever the decision about various modes of advertising, there can 
be no dispute over the fact that competition thrives on comparison, and 
comparison is generated by advertising. Any formula for truth which 
results in silence should be unacceptable. 
different purchasers . . . for use, consumption, or resale . . . •  " where the effect has one 
of certain specified anticompetitive consequences. 
91. Federal Trade Commission Act § 12, 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1958). 
92. See report of speech by Paul Rand Dixon, supra note 45. 
